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Abstract 
Starting in 2010, the Fidesz party achieved in a row six (partly landslide) victories at municipal, 
national, and European Parliament elections. Not questioning other explanations, my ongoing research 
traces the remarkable resilience of the ruling party above all to earlier “tectonic” shifts in civil society, 
which helped the Right accumulate ample social capital well before its political triumph. This process 
was decisively advanced by the Civic Circles Movement founded by Viktor Orbán after the lost 
election of 2002. This movement was militant in terms of its hegemonic aspirations and collective 
practices; massive in terms of its membership and activism; middle-cIass based in terms of social 
stratification; and dominantly metropolitan and urban on the spatial dimension. Parallel to contentious 
mobilization, the civic circles re-organized and extended the Right’s grass-roots networks, 
associations, and media; rediscovered and reinvented its holidays and everyday life-styles, symbols, 
and heroes; and explored innovative ways for cultural, charity, leisure, and political activities. Leading 
activists, among them patriots, priests, professionals, politicians, and pundits, offered new frames and 
practices for Hungarians to feel, think, and act as members of “imagined communities”: the nation, 
Christianity, citizenry, and Europe.  
Keywords 
Civil society and the struggle for Right-wing hegemony, Versatile nationalism, Church-bound 
activism, „Organic intellectuals” of Right-wing media. 
 
  1 
Introduction 
The shock waves sent by Brexit and Donald Trump’s Presidency through the political establishment 
intensified the scholarly debates about the sources and consequences of discontent with liberal 
democracy. This paper seeks to contribute to these debates with a new analysis of the Hungarian case.
 
1
 I submit that the rise of illiberal, nationalist, and xenophobic leaders in some long-established 
Western and new post-socialist democracies make the Hungarian Premier Viktor Orbán’s illiberal 
state-building appear as less exceptional or extreme than was the case before. Even so, some key 
features of the Orbán regime, namely its resilience, emergence through incremental but transformative 
change, and roots in a vibrant Right-dominated civil society, point to its broader relevance for 
comparativists.  
Compared to Western illiberal political projects so far in opposition (as in France or Austria) or still 
in their infancy when in power (as in the USA or Poland), the Hungarian regime has already ample 
proofs of its viability. Starting in 2010, Orbán’s Fidesz party achieved in a row six (partly landslide) 
victories at municipal, national, and European parliamentary elections. The party’s popularity during 
the run-up to the 2018 elections indicates that it has a good chance for staying in power for a third 
term. At the same time, in contrast to the electoral authoritarianisms of Russia or Turkey, these 
successes have been achieved without open repression or systematic large-scale electoral fraud. 
Instead, the regime evolved almost surreptitiously through adoption of a patchwork of illiberal „worst 
practices” allegedly emulating other democracies.  
Backed by the party’s super-majority and barely constrained by the fragmented opposition, these 
measures undermined media freedom, extended government control over the judiciary, weakened the 
constitutional protection of minorities, and manipulated the electoral law in favour of the incumbent. 
Most recently, NGOs active in the fields of human rights, civil liberties, and control of corruption, and 
even a private higher education institution, the Central European University, became targets of 
harassment by the authority. By 2017 hardly any actor or institution of the polity escaped the regime’s 
direct or indirect control. The rollback of Hungarian democracy seems to be a textbook example of 
incremental but ultimately transformative change indeed.
2
  
Not questioning other explanations, which stress the Fidesz governments’ skill and will to cement 
their rule, weakness of the opposition, and the EU’s ineffective response to democratic backsliding,3 
this paper emphasizes a so far neglected factor: the superior social embeddedness of the Right and its 
consequences.  
I trace the rise and resilience of the Orbán regime to earlier „tectonic” shifts in civil society, which 
allowed the Right to accumulate ample social capital well before its political victory in 2010.
4
 I argue 
that while in opposition in 2002-2010, Fidesz and its allies in civil society worked hard to catch up 
with the Left, which, due to inherited resources, initially seemed to be better positioned to foster civil 
                                                     
1
 I presented an earlier version of the paper at the seminar series of the Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies of 
European University Institute, Florence, October 12 2016.  
2
 For a summary of these measures see János Kornai, „Hungary’s U-Turn: Retreating from Democracy.” Journal of 
Democracy 26, no. 3, July 2015: 34-48. For an analysis of the „legalistic” methods used by the Orbán regime to roll back 
democracy see Gábor Halmai, „The Decline of Liberal Democracy in Europe’s Midst”, EUROZINE, 27 September 2016, 
accessed online on June 2 2017 at http://www.eurozine.com/the-decline-of-liberal-democracy-in-europes-midst/ 
3
 See the articles by Jacques Rupnik, „How Things Went Wrong”, 132-37; Miklós Bánkuti, Gábor Halmai, and Kim Lane 
Scheppele, „Disabling the Constitution, 138-46; and Erin K. Jenne and Cas Mudde, „Can Outsiders Help?”, 147-55, all in 
Journal of Democracy 23, no. 3, July 2012.  
4
 This thesis was originally proposed in Béla Greskovits and Jason Wittenberg, „Civil Society and Democratic 
Consolidation in Hungary in the 1990s and 2000s”. Paper presented at the Council for European Studies’ Twentieth 
International Conference of Europeanists, Amsterdam, 25-27 June 2013.  
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organization. Even if it took eight years for the Right to eventually transform its social capital into 
political capital, there is an essential element of truth in the quip of one Socialist politician: “Fidesz 
did not win its super-majority in the lottery.” The paper elaborates that the seeds of success were sown 
by the Civic Circles Movement founded by Orbán in Spring 2002. 
My analysis is based on the Civic Circles Event Database of about 4900 events organized, co-
organized, or sponsored by the movement and attended by its members in the period July 2002-April 
2006. I constructed the database from the Electronic Newsletter of Civic Circles, and other media 
sources. Originally collected by civic circle members and preserved by Open Society Archives (OSA), 
the newsletter consists of civic circle messages. The database does not contain personal, secret or 
classified data. Per Hungarian and EU law, the messages are anonymized except for those from 
persons performing public functions about public matters, and used solely for my historical research.  
The first section highlights two prominent features of the movement: its ambivalence towards 
formal democratic institutions, and its dual, simultaneously civic and hegemonic, strategy to transform 
civil society. These features are explained by the motivations of leaders and activists influenced by the 
political situation at the movement’s birth.  
The second section characterizes the movement’s contentious actions, the social status of members 
and activists, its geographical spread, and organizational and individual membership. The third section 
focuses on the circles’ mode of coordination, which differed in various periods.  
The fourth section argues that the movement’s lasting impact stems from its success in demarcating 
and expanding the Right’s “own” public sphere by frames and practices of versatile nationalism, 
church-bound activism, and uphill struggles for creating the outlets and captive audiences of Right-
wing media.  
The conclusions summarize the findings and point to puzzles for future research.  
“Janus-faced” at birth  
Founded after Fidesz marginally lost the Spring 2002 elections, the movement was born out of a 
compromise proposed by Viktor Orbán, who came relatively fast to terms with the defeat at the hands 
of the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and the Liberal Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), and 
willy-nilly accepted by his radicalized constituency, for which it was more difficult to reconcile itself 
with the fiasco. Given that Orbán’s speech delivered at a massive rally on May 7th, 2002 is rightly 
seen as the movement’s founding document, it deserves to be reviewed at some length. 
Declaring that the elections were a closed case after their results were officially confirmed, Orbán 
suggested his followers to accept the outcome, however unjust it might have seemed in their eyes, and 
put an end to their ongoing massive campaign of street protests, petitions and lawsuits for recounting 
the votes. Instead, he invited them for common soul-searching. Was it not the case, Orbán asked, that 
the defeat was also because the forces of “civic Hungary” were not yet fully prepared for their mission 
of rising the nation, and if so, what was to be done about it? He saw the solution in the Civic Circles 
Movement.  
“I ask you in the coming three months to form small groups of people, troupes of friends, civic 
circles. What we need is not formal organizations, but to get together, join our forces, and be on 
the alert. We need to launch hundreds of civic circles and companionships. Our force is in our 
numbers, but it will become real power only if we can get organized. Our force becomes real only 
if we can create and organize the public sphere of civic Hungary. Therefore, I ask the hundreds of 
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civic circles, which I hope will emerge, to check in at the known phone numbers of Democracy 
Center. We need to know about each other to move together when our fate wills so.” 
5
 
Orbán’s call appealed to various groups within the Right-wing constituency. After all, the circles 
promised to help avoid the two dangers political losers usually face: apathy and radicalization. By 
creating community spaces for grassroots organization, participation and initiative, the circles offered 
a medicine against apathy and, in line with a “Tocquevillian” view of civil society, could become 
bulwarks of freedom and autonomy in a regime, which their members viewed as illegitimate and 
unresponsive.
6
  
Indeed, the “circles” meant direct reference to “small circles of freedom”, a catchword in 
Hungarian political parlance. Originally coined by the great Hungarian scholar István Bibó, the phrase 
was rich in historical connotations, as it denoted autonomous sites and networks of solidarity and 
safeguarding of interests, which since the Middle Ages fiercely resisted the powerholders’ brutal 
attempts to subordinate people to centralized political rule, and thus became hotbeds of civic virtue 
and social progress, albeit more in Western Europe than in Hungary.
7
  
At the same time, the movement could provide an alternative to further radicalization, which was 
an imminent danger at the time. The “troupes” of militant activist were asked to return to still to-be-
built “barracks” in civil society, and transform their strength in numbers into organized real power 
before launching a new assault on the power-holders. This way, the circles were meant to elicit a 
compromise between the less and the more radical Right-wing constituencies as well.  
Nevertheless, the following example of one of the many protests initiated by the movement shows 
that anger about the “stolen” elections coupled with distrust in the MSZP-SZDSZ coalition 
government had been formative for the activists’ mindset for years to come. 
„[T]hose who feel that the procedures of the Spring 2002 elections were illegally manipulated or 
its results faked, should wear a black mourning band at the anniversary […] as a symbol of our 
farewell to our government’s achievements […] new highways, family farms, new jobs, rights for 
free assembly, media, and speech, rising wages and pensions, for three more years. […] Let us 
devote two weeks to nation-wide mourning, and then combat the madness of the current 
government with even more resolve. If we were not allowed to recount the votes, let us count at 
least those who believe the elections were unfair.”
8
  
This example puts the motivation of activists in sharp relief. They appear to have been individuals 
who, driven by particularly intense political preferences, were ready to question election outcomes and 
resort to resistance whenever key rules of democratic decisions, the “one man one vote” rule and the 
rule of periodic vote, relegated them to a minority exposed to what they viewed as a “tyranny of the 
majority.”9 
Albert Hirschman’s succinct summary of the dual character of democratic vote helps to clarify the 
sources of the civic circles’ ambivalence towards formal democracy. On the one hand, Hirschman sees 
the voting rules as key elements of “an institutional framework affording a defence against an 
excessively repressive state; on the other […] as a safeguard against an excessively expressive 
                                                     
5
 Orbán Viktor beszéde a Disz téren on 7th May 2002. Accessed on 2016 November 17 at 
http://mkdsz1.freeweb.hu/n22/orban020507.html Translations of all the cited Hungarian texts are by myself. 
6
 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America. (New York: Vintage, 1990). 
7
 Bibó István, „A magyar társadalomfejlődés és az 1945 évi változás értelme,” [Hungarian Social Development and the 
Sense of the Changes in 1945] in. Válogatott tanulmányok. Második kötet, 1945-1949. (Budapest: Magvető Könyvkiadó, 
1986), 485-504, esp. 492-499.  
8
 Event Database, 2003. 
9
 de Tocqueville, Democracy in America.  
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citizenry.”10 Given that after the defeat in 2002 the next opportunity for voting in parliamentary 
elections was far away, the activists resented that while cementing the incumbent’s power, the 
democratic rules were more a hindrance than a help in making their own strongly held opinions 
politically consequential. Their discontent was exacerbated by their conviction that the government 
was busy undermining the checks and balances, which could protect the opposition.  
In line with the mindset of activists for whom non-conventional political participation was 
imperative, Orbán proclaimed “the birth of a new mass-movement with autonomous political profile 
and will, whose members, representing all social strata, refused to vacate the sphere of public action 
even after the elections.”11 Adding fuel to the fire, in his foundational speech he also asserted that the 
members of the movement must not view themselves as a defeated minority in opposition at all.  
„Civic Hungary is not one smaller or larger part of this country. It is the whole. […] Even if our 
parties and elected representatives might be in opposition in the parliament, we, all those present 
in this square, will not and cannot be in opposition, because it is impossible for the nation to be in 
opposition. It is only a government that may end up in opposition to its own people if it abandons 
acting in the nation’s interest.”
12
 
This statement of hegemonic aspirations sheds light on Orbán’s essentially “Gramscian” perspective 
on civil society as a battlefield of ideologies and organizations.
13
 If it was impossible for the nation to 
be in opposition, then its true representatives had to strive for hegemony.
14
 The related strategy 
envisaged recruitment of individuals to the Right-wing camp through penetrating and controlling their 
existing and newly founded organizations. This implies that the movement was to become Janus-faced 
not only for its ambivalence towards democratic institutions but for its simultaneous civic and 
hegemonic approach to civil society as well.  
On the one hand, in a Tocquevillian tradition as it were, the civic circles played a crucial role in re-
organizing and extending the civic Right’s grass-roots networks, associations, and media; 
rediscovering and reinventing its everyday life-styles, holidays, symbols, and heroes; and mobilizing 
their members in innovative ways for participation in cultural, educational, charity, and leisure 
activities.
15
 The circles did not have to start “from scratch”. Rather, at a much larger scale though, the 
movement followed the program and some (but not all) of the practices of the Movement of Hungarian 
Way Circles, founded in 1993 by writer and politician István Csurka in 1993 with the aim of creating a 
social-organizational basis for his radical nationalist Party of Hungarian Life and Justice (MIÉP).
16
  
On the other hand, by superimposing the Gramscian on the Tocquevillian logic, the Civic Circles 
Movement harnessed civic activism ultimately for political ends.
17
 Ample evidence suggests that the 
activists found the dual strategy appealing even if due to personal skills, temperament and ambitions 
                                                     
10
 Albert O. Hirschman, Shifting Involvements. Private Interests and Public Action. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1982): 106.  
11
 Cited in Népszava, September 3, 2002, from the website of the Alliance for the Nation Civic Circle founded by Orbán.  
12
 Orbán Viktor beszéde.  
13
 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks. (New York: International Publishers, 1971). 
14
 See Szabó Ildikó, „A nemzet fogalmi konstrukciója a Fidesz diskurzusaiban 1998 és 2006 között.” [The Discoursive 
Construction of the Nation by Fidesz in 1998-2006.] Politikatudományi Szemle 15, 3 (2007): 129-159, for an analytical 
overview of the party’s changing concepts of the nation, and the related symbolic practices. 
15
 Tocqueville, Democracy in America.  
16
 István Csurka, Keserű hátország. Tanulmányok. [Bitter Hinterland. A Collection of Studies.] (Budapest: Magyar Fórum 
Könyvek, 1993). 
17
 In the distinction between the Tocquevillian and Gramscian approach to civil society I follow David Riley, „Civic 
Associations and Authoritarian Regimes in Interwar Europe: Italy and Spain in Comparative Perspective.” American 
Sociological Review 70 (288: April 2005): 288-310. Riley used Gramsci’s notion to characterize the Italian Fascist 
party’s conquest of civil society. By using the notion I do not mean to suggest that Fidesz is a Fascist party. 
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some were more attracted by civic and others by political involvement, while their majority willingly 
engaged in both.  
Mobilized metropolitan middle-class  
In 2002-2006, when its activity peaked, the Civic Circles Movement was militant in pursuing its 
agendas, middle-class based in terms of social stratification, dominantly metropolitan and urban on the 
spatial dimension, and massive in terms of membership and activities.  
Militancy 
Given the activists’ dissatisfaction with conventional politics and distrust in the MSZP-SZDSZ 
government, which made them feel impatient and embattled, and their assertiveness fed by hegemonic 
aspirations, the circles’ frequent turn to contention is no major surprise after all. However, some 
characteristic features of militancy, such as the temporal dynamics of protest events in comparison 
with those organized and/or attended by actors on the Left, and the types of protests and contested 
issues are worthy of analysis. 
My earlier study of Hungarian protests, co-authored by Jason Wittenberg, revealed increasing 
divergence between the frequency of contentious events organized by Right-wing and Left-wing 
actors.
18
 We found that while the Right was more contentious over the whole period of 1995-2011 
covered in our analysis, the gap between Rightist and Leftist contention significantly widened after 
2002. Importantly, after 2002 the civic circles were frequently mentioned as organizers, sponsors, or 
participants of protests.  
The growing militancy of the Right might be surprising given that the good times of the Fidesz 
government’s “Hungarian Model” of 1998-2002 initially continued under the MSZP-SZDSZ coalition, 
which implemented Premier Péter Medgyessy’s campaign promise of “Transformation with Welfare.” 
Until the middle of the decade economic growth, declining unemployment, the expanding welfare 
state, and accession to the EU in 2004, all seem to have “conspired” for social peace. In 2002-2006 
social problems were relatively rarely reported among the drivers of protest indeed. During the hard 
times starting in 2007, economic protests partly organized or supported by the Right became more 
frequent. Interestingly, the Right has continued to rule the streets even after the landslide victory of 
Fidesz in 2010 – an issue to which I will return below. 
For a snapshot of the causes and forms of militancy I rely on the Civic Circles Event Database of 
2004. (Table 1.) By this year, the civic circles became a mass-movement with nation-wide presence, 
created new channels of communication and forms of association, and cooperated with numerous 
allies in civil society and the political sphere.  
  
                                                     
18
 Béla Greskovits and Jason Wittenberg, Civil Society and Democratic Consolidation in Hungary in the 1990s and 2000s. 
Budapest and Berkeley: Unpublished Manuscript, February 27, 2016. Our findings rely on empirical evidence on about 
4800 protest events in 1989-2011 collected from media sources for the comparative project „The Logic of Civil Society 
in New Democracies: Hungary, Poland, South Korea, and Taiwan” conducted by Grzegorz Ekiert, Jan Kubik, Michal 
Wenzel, Jason Wittenberg, Sunhyuk Kim, Chin-en Wu, and myself. 
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Table 1: Forms of protest and specific issues triggering contention (co)organized or sponsored 
by civic circles, and/or attended by their members in 2004  
  
Forms of contention 
 
Forms Petitions, open letters, 
statements, and other forms of 
„soft protest” 
Demonstrations, 
rallies, marches 
Strikes, strike 
alerts, blockades 
Number of 
events 
72 
 
30 2 
  
Issues triggering contention 
 
Issues Identity Rulers’ 
practices  
Media Socio-
economic and 
environmental 
Number of 
events 
52 25 19 19 
 National Christian Anti-
Communist 
and / or 
antiliberal 
   
Number of 
events 
30 13 10 25 19 19 
Author’s calculation based on the Event Database 2004. Event numbers in specific categories 
exceed the total number of contentious events because some events combined several forms of 
contention, and were triggered by multiple grievances. 
In 2004 the civic circles were involved in 100 protests, which accounted for about 7 percent of the 
events of the year. The bulk of contention was driven by three key issues of Right-wing identity: the 
national question, Christianity, and anti-Communism merged with anti-liberalism. Outrage about the 
disagreeable practices of the MSZP-SZDSZ government and misdeeds of Left-Liberal public as well 
as private commercial media led to protests too. Yet disruptive or violent contention was almost 
absent. Instead, “graphomaniac” forms of resistance, such as petitions, open letters, and public 
statements were dominant in the repertoire.  
Even so, the Right’s militancy surprised the powerholders. After all, it heralded the end of 
“patience” hitherto characteristic to Hungary’s capitalist and democratic transformation.19 Resorting to 
their earlier rhetoric, the Left and Liberal elites reacted swiftly by demonizing their challengers. 
Already in 2002, witnessing the heated political conflicts and mass-mobilization around the elections, 
writer and publicist István Eörsi worried about a spreading “spiritual need for Fascism.”20 But even in 
the relatively quiet year of 2004 Socialist politicians and media pundits repeatedly talked about Right-
wing mobs ruling the streets and terrorizing the peaceful majority. Although protesters tended to use 
aggressive slogans and strong language indeed, considering the above evidence the terms Fascism and 
                                                     
19
 On the factors of patience see Béla Greskovits, The Political Economy of Protest and Patience. East European and Latin 
American Transformations Compared (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1998).  
20
 Eörsi István, „A fasizmus, mint lelki igény.” [Fascism as a spiritual need.] Népszabadság, May 2, 2002. 
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mob appear as stark exaggerations. Moreover, adding insult to injury, these labels might have been 
counter-productive, since they provoked new protests. 
Social status 
In an interview the movement’s chief coordinator Csaba Hende tried to refute the demonizing labels 
by emphasizing the respectable social status and conservative worldview of civic circle members:  
„The overwhelming majority of civic circle members is highly educated, well-to-do, conservative 
intellectual. I suggest you to visit any larger civic circle event, and look at the cars parking around. 
There is no reason to assume that this is a frustrated, agitated crowd, interested in anarchy or 
overthrowing the constitutional order.”
21
 
Other evidence from the Civic Circles Event Database confirms the educated middle-class character of 
the movement. The overwhelming majority of activities was non-contentious and had some 
educational purpose and/or form. These activities included lectures, workshops, conferences, or 
cultural, charity, entertainment and professional events, as well as educational excursions and youth 
summer camps. The organizers, performers, and participants were typically „white collar” employees 
of the state or the private and civil sphere: teachers, lawyers, doctors, students, the clergy, 
entrepreneurs, journalists, pundits, artists, actors, and politicians. The usual venues – churches, 
monasteries, church-bound gymnasiums and community centres, clubs, cafés, „national” bookshops, 
cultural centres, and party offices – were unlikely to attract crowds from the margins of society. 
Finally, participants were often asked to buy tickets, pay for the services provided, donate to charitable 
funds, or make in-kind-contributions, such as voluntary work or home-made meals. 
Uneven geographical spread  
Considering the movement’s middle-class features, it is little surprise that most events took place in 
Budapest and its greater metropolitan area, as well as in the most populous cities of the countryside. 
After the long decades of Soviet-type socialism, where else could the movement tap on remaining 
reserves of a Right-wing “Bildungsbürgertum” than in the capital or the cultural-administrative centres 
of the counties? 
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 Halász Csilla, „Kinek az érdeke?” [Whose interest?] Interjú Hende Csabával. Heti Válasz, February 27, 2004. 
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Table 2: Spatial features of the Civic Circles Movement, 2002-2006 
 Metropolitan and urban 
 Budapest 
metro-area 
County capital Smaller town, 
village 
“Greater 
Hungary” 
% of all events 58 14 29 10 
 Center – periphery 
 Top three 
districts: 
V., VIII., XII. 
Bottom three 
districts: 
X., XX., XXI. 
Top three 
counties: 
Pest, Fejér,  
Csongrád 
Bottom three 
counties: 
Nógrád, Zala 
Jász-Nagykun- 
Szolnok 
% of events in 
Budapest and 
counties  
41 1 
 
45 5 
 
Author’s calculation based on the Event Database 2002-2006. The sum of percentages of events in 
specific categories exceed 100 percent, because some events took place in multiple locations 
within Hungary or by crossing state borders. 
The puzzle of remarkable vibrancy of associational life in the capital’s satellite towns and villages is 
partly solved if we consider that geographical proximity and a functional transport infrastructure made 
it easy for activists from Budapest to help organize, and invited journalists, professionals, artists and 
politicians to perform at, the community events in these municipalities. However, a demand-side 
factor, namely a national-conservative and Anti-Communist spirit rooted in the peculiar social 
structure of these settlements, might have been even more important. It was here, where many ethnic 
Hungarians who had fled from the neighbouring states after the First and Second World Wars decided 
to settle, since due to legal restrictions and prohibitive housing prices they could not afford to live in 
Budapest where they typically worked. Similar was the case of the “kulak” and peasant masses from 
the countryside, who, leaving behind their land, livestock and equipment collectivized by the 
Communists, found new employment in the capital and built through efforts of several generations 
new homes in the fast-growing satellite villages and towns around it.
22
 More recently, especially (but 
not only) the settlements in the Buda-hills became magnets for young middle-class families who left 
the over-populated and polluted capital and found cheaper but better housing opportunities and quality 
environment on its outskirts.  
Only a fragment of events took place in smaller towns and even less in villages outside the metro-
area. Indeed, most of the smaller municipalities, which did host some activities, had distinguishing 
features: for example, touristic, recreational or cultural attractions. Finally, a sizable number of events 
happened abroad, mainly but not exclusively in the neighbouring countries with significant ethnic 
Hungarian minorities, which tells about the movement’s trans-border and transnational expansion. 
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 Berkovits György, Világváros határában. [Borderlands of a Metropolis.] (Budapest: Szépirodalmi Könyvkiadó, 1976). 
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The uneven distribution of civic activism is even more striking when we consider its high 
concentration in but a few districts of Budapest and a handful of counties. (Table 2.) The capital’s 
central and/or affluent districts hosted far more events than its peripheral and typically working-class 
districts. Similarly, while the central and more affluent counties had a vibrant Right-wing civic life, 
some of the peripheral and poor counties showed a devastated landscape from this viewpoint as well. 
Geographic proximity notwithstanding, the “internal peripheries” of Budapest were not more 
accessible for the civic circles than the deep peripheries of the countryside. 
This socio-geographical pattern allows propositions on the movement’s political mobilization 
potentials and constraints. Through the circles the Right managed to consolidate and expand its 
presence in partly “enemy-occupied territories”, which hitherto counted among the bulwarks of the 
MSZP and SZDSZ. In contrast, the working-class neighborhoods of Budapest and the decaying heavy-
industrial factory towns of the countryside remained “no-go-areas” for the movement. There, social 
structural and cultural features continued to work in favour of Left-dominated politics as the only 
game in town, at least for some time. Finally, the overwhelming majority of Hungarian municipalities 
was out of reach not just for the civic circles, but for any political or civil organization. 
Massive participation  
Given that most circles never formally registered as civil association or foundation, we must rely on 
the perhaps inflated numbers publicly mentioned by Hende and other leaders. They knew about 11 
thousand smaller or larger civic circles, which had 163 thousand individual members active in 
thousand municipalities. This data confirms the impression of a mass-movement, whose strength in 
numbers was comparable to the combined membership of Hungarian parties (124 thousand in 2008), 
the net membership of all trade unions (580 thousand in 2005), or the sum of employees and unpaid 
volunteers of non-profit organizations (537 thousand in 2006).
23
 
The Event Database reveals that the circles acted in collaboration with hundreds of other, officially 
registered patriotic, church-bound, professional, cultural, and local-level political organizations, as 
well as many small and medium-size private businesses, which, whether on grounds of material 
interest or ideological sympathy or both, aligned with the Right.  
Importantly, all these organizations became increasingly “Inter-Networked.” In 2003, the 
Newsletter was sent to about 14 thousand, and in early 2006 about 25 thousand, electronic addresses. 
The combination of dense and centralized electronic networks with decentralized inter-personal 
communication channels and newly emerging local, regional, and national media forums goes far 
explaining the movement’s effectivity in informing about and mobilizing for participation in the 4900 
events of the 2002-2006 period. What else do we know about the movement’s coordination?  
Shifting mode of coordination 
To be admitted to the movement, the circles had to register with the Democracy Center, originally a 
watchdog organization that Fidesz established during the 2002 elections to collect reports on and seek 
remedy for anomalies. The Center functioned as the basic hub of communication among the circles, 
and between them and a plethora of other aligned associations, foundations, and political parties. The 
movement’s chief coordinator Csaba Hende, originally member of the conservative Hungarian 
Democratic Forum (MDF), reported to Viktor Orbán. 
The movement capitalized on other existing resources as well. Parallel to the rapid expansion of the 
grassroots base, as early as on May 26th, 2002 Orbán founded his own “Alliance for the Nation,” the 
5000th civic circle. The Alliance was a conglomerate of more than a dozen large religious, patriotic, 
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political, professional, family, women, and youth organizations, founded well before the civic circles, 
and represented by their leaders or public figures. These organizations included the Committee for 
Historical Justice (representing revolutionaries and victims of the 1956 Revolution); the Movement for 
the Peasant Victims of Communism; the Catholic Alliance of Christian Intellectuals, the Hungarian 
Kolping Association, the Protestant Association for Community Culture, the Alliance for Hungarian 
Families Association; the Hungarian Civic Women’s Forum; the patriotic National Unity Movement, 
and Action Alliance for Hungary; the conservative intellectuals’ Batthyány Circle of Professors; the 
Association for Hungarian Civic Cooperation; as well as four youth organizations, Fidelitas, the 
Association of the April Youth (both closely linked to Fidesz), the Right-wing Youth Community (the 
social movement predecessor of the radical Right-wing Jobbik party), the Alliance of Piarist Students; 
and the official media outlet of the Alliance for the Nation, also called ”Alliance”.24 
Since many of these organizations disposed of financial resources, buildings and other 
infrastructure, professional expertise on a variety of subjects, and hundreds of active members of their 
own, initially they played a key role in consolidating the existence, helping the expansion, setting the 
agenda, and filling the event calendar of the many smaller and relatively resource-poor circles. 
Moreover, especially in 2002-2003, the Alliance frequently made public statements, issued directives, 
or called for participation in contentious and noncontentious activities.  
Centralized communication, hierarchical chain of command at the top, and the smaller circles’ 
dependence on a flagship organization that could be dubbed the “mother of all circles”, all point to a 
political and top-heavy mode of coordination. While in perfect match with the Gramscian strategy, the 
expected gains from political control and the peculiarity of the latter merit further explanation.  
The short-term gains can be traced to the situation at the movement’s birth. The Fidesz-led 
coalition of 1998-2002 with the Independent Smallholders’ Party (FKGP) and the Hungarian 
Democratic Forum (MDF) as junior partners, brought about a dramatic restructuring on the Right side 
of political spectrum. By 2002 only Fidesz got stronger, while all the other Right-wing parties 
weakened or fell apart. The negative consequences materialized at the 2002 parliamentary elections. 
Neither FKGP nor the radical Right-wing MIÉP made it to the new parliament, while MDF passed the 
threshold only thanks to its electoral coalition with Fidesz. This meant that Fidesz, despite its success 
in getting the largest number of votes, could not form a new governing coalition.  
Forced into opposition and facing municipal elections in the Fall of 2002, soon to be followed by a 
referendum on EU-accession in 2003 and the country’s first European parliamentary elections on June 
13th, 2004, Fidesz was in bad need of new arrangements to consolidate and expand its own and the 
Right’s constituency. While a strategy aimed to foster collaboration among like-minded parties - and 
summarized in the slogan “there is one camp there is one flag” - did exist, it had to be adapted to the 
new circumstances. In 2002, the implosion of their favored parties left hundred-thousands of Right-
wing voters without representation and many hundreds of activists without their former “employers.”  
Tapping into the pool of these “orphaned” activists before political rivals would do so was as 
urgent as it was complicated. Back in 2002, hardly could the Fidesz apparatus absorb them. The 
reason was that, as political analyst Gábor Gavra wrote: “within the circles’ activist base there were 
two clearly distinguished groups. Besides Orbán’s sizeable young upper-middle class fanclub, no less 
prominent were the activists of the 1990s’ Right-wing parties, socialized in the action-focused world 
of FKGP and MIÉP mass-rallies and keeping strong reservations about the ‘liberal roots’ of Fidesz 
members and leaders.”25 They trusted Orbán but distrusted his party. The distrust was mutual. “Old-
school” Fidesz apparatchiks, who were blamed for the lost elections, worried that the newcomers were 
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going to be a threat to their established positions. In the view of the famous architect Imre Makovecz, 
himself a prominent activist of the movement, their fears were not without base:  
“Viktor Orbán invented the Civic Circles Movement to rid local Fidesz organizations of petty 
politicians merely motivated by their own survival and replace them with people with real interest 
and involvement in public affairs. I spent three years of my life traveling in the country to help the 
birth of these Civic Circles.”
26 
In this situation, when many devoted activists and potential voters were up for grabs, the civic circles 
seemed to be an optimal albeit temporary gathering place for the dispersed and politically homeless 
crowds – a first but important step towards their attempted unification under the Fidesz flag that 
started one year later. Hence the reason for one peculiarity of the movement’s initial mode of 
coordination: while it was political and top-heavy, this reflected Orbán’s personal leadership rather 
than institutionalized control by his party.  
Precisely because the “civic camp” aimed to gather all ideologically conscious fractions of 
Hungarian Right, the Christian-national middle-class, the populist-national middle-class, and various 
groups of the radical Right, and, indeed, it aspired to represent the whole society, it was clear that 
hardly would the diverse activist groups rally around a single party flag. Hence the political rationale 
behind Orbán’s claim that the movement would elevate the national cause above the petty world of 
partisan divisions, skirmishes, and horse-trading in the parliament.  
For the same reason, a rigid hierarchical chain of command alone was unlikely to keep the 
movement in motion. The solution was a “hybrid” pattern of coordination that fostered frequent 
interactions between the top and the diverse bases of the movement to combine the advantages of 
hierarchy with relative autonomy, and robustness with flexibility and innovation - in line with what 
social movement scholars would recommend.
27
  
A complete inventory of the partly horizontally coordinated or fully self-organized activities would 
easily fill another paper. Let me mention but a few concrete examples. The circles were encouraged to 
identify and occupy their own niche in civil society. Many circles chose names, and designed their 
own flag, logo, or even coat of arms. Via the Electronic Newsletter they could advertise and share 
their “best practices” with others. They participated in competitions to contribute to the visions and 
activities of the movement. The jury of one competition awarded the first prize a study on 
“Recapturing the holidays and everyday life”, which, published as a booklet, was then recommended 
as a manual for civic circle activists. Every other week saw the emergence of new local initiatives for 
charity, soon expanding in regional, national, and transnational spaces. Notwithstanding their 
occasional naiveté, small ideas on how to celebrate traditional old or invented new holidays in “civic 
ways” were picked up by hundreds. Invitations to spend quality time together at educational 
excursions, tourist trips, pilgrimages, national or local holidays, concerts, food, wine, and art festivals, 
or balls were circulated. Detailed instructions on how to file effective legal complaints against 
scandalous media contents, and how to protest the Iraq war or environmental degradation were 
elaborated, shared, and used to train activists and attract participants at all levels of the movement.  
This interactive dimension of coordination was for some time left untouched by the big changes 
starting in Spring 2003, when Fidesz transformed itself into a catch-all “people’s party”. The party 
adopted the new name Fidesz–Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz-MPSZ), created a new leadership 
structure, which concentrated decision making power in Orbán’s hands, and reinvigorated its electoral 
vote-getting apparatus and strategy. Reform of the functional organs was complemented by adding a 
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layer of new representative bodies through which, as Zsolt Enyedi put it, the party structure was 
“supposed to mirror the social structure. Sections for workers, women, pensioners, smallholders, 
intellectuals, and so on, have been established. The leaders of the sections are members of the party 
leadership.”28  
For the civic circles, the changes brought a new era of incorporation of many of their members into 
the party machinery. Consequently, 1000 local Fidesz-MPSZ organizations came to existence, the 
party’s membership grew from 5 thousand to 35 thousand, and the influence of local party offices in 
initiating and coordinating civic activism strengthened. All in all, while the mixture of top-heavy and 
interactive modes in the movement’s coordination prevailed, the political control was no longer 
personalistic but rather institutionalized partisan. Accordingly, while one member of Orbán’s Alliance 
for the Nation Civic Circle joined the party’s leadership as section leader, and many other continued to 
attend and perform at local events, the Alliance did not hold meetings in 2004. The most ambitious 
members of the smaller circles joined Fidesz-MPSZ, and continued to organize civic life from within 
the party. But even those who stayed in the circles, turned more often to political activism for the 
party. The evolving pattern of agendas, activities, and alliances, which mirrored the dynamic changes 
in the local and national political environment, are vividly described by a leading activist of a 
relatively large civic circle (with 200 members) in one of the county capitals. 
„We meet regularly, once every other week. Our relationship with the historical Churches is 
outstanding, they provided the venue for our meetings. In 2002 our community was forged by 
organizing protests, boycots, and celebrating our national holidays. In 2003 we focused more on 
cooperation with Right-wing civil associations, meetings with prominent experts, well-known 
politicians and acclaimed artists, building stronger ties with the local Fidesz organization, and 
joining the new sections of Fidesz-MPSZ. We hosted László Kövér, Annamária Szalai, Csaba 
Hende, Károly Szita, Imre Schrammel, Ágnes Seszták and Zsolt Bayer. This was also the year 
when we started to become more visible: by organizing fairs for charitable purposes, distributing 
gifts (food and toys) to large families on Christmas and Easter, and holding press conferences as 
well as annual sessions on the state of affairs in Hungary. With guests from other towns we 
gathered at the Greater Hungary monument in our town to mark the anniversary of the Trianon 
Treaty with a festive event. Bus excursions to the House of Terror, Herend, Veszprém, to meetings 
and events in the county and other parts of Hungary, as well as common celebrations of the year’s 
end and name-days made the atmosphere of our community ever more intimate and family-like. 
During the 2004 EP election campaign, we contacted many families, visited villages, collected 
more than 4000 signatures for the National Petition, and were every day on duty in the local Fidesz 
office. We feel to have played a role in the victory of the Right in our hometown. In future, we 
want to reach out to high-school students and help them be acquainted with our national traditions, 
host celebrities and maintain our involvement in charitable activities, and be even more present in 
the public sphere - all this not least in order to prepare the ground for success in the 2006 
elections.”
29
  
As hinted in this miniature „self-study,” in addition to the recruitment of new activists, the Gramscian 
conquest of civil society paved the way to the accumulation of a wealth of micro-data about the 
political preferences and attitudes of the electorate. Such data could be collected during elections and 
referenda, or were the by-product – or, indeed, the real purpose - of frequent petitioning. In turn, an 
army of devoted local activists with access to names, addresses, and data on political orientations, has 
allowed canvassing, that is, systematic efforts to approach citizens at home to learn about and 
influence their electoral preferences. This was crucial, because the party realized that in the Hungarian 
system the outcome of elections mainly depended on the mandates gained in the 176 single member 
constituencies. Csaba Hende told the weekly journal HVG that during the run-up to the parliamentary 
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elections of 2006 it was up to the party’s electoral district bosses to distribute tasks among civic circle 
activists. He also pointed to the importance of canvassing.  
"’In the coming year, the key task of civic circle members will be to approach each citizen 
individually and convince them to vote for the proper candidate’ […] Hende added that Fidesz-
MPSZ ought to win over especially those who lacked a clear political identity, since their vote was 
going to be decisive.”
30
 
While the technology of canvassing has been fine-tuned over the decade to follow, the gathering of 
micro-data has remained closely linked to petitioning. As recently noted by Ákos Hadházy, formerly a 
member of Fidesz, and currently a leader of the party Politics Can Be Different (LMP): 
“The national consultation has no other purpose than collecting names.
31
 Back in time when I was 
still a Fidesz-MP, I saw the list of persons with a number attached to their name. If the individual 
signs a petition, his or her number increases accordingly. These personal data are registered and 
kept in alphabetical order in each municipality. Activists then use the database to decide which 
voters are to be personally approached.”
32
 
In this respect, it seems significant that Gábor Kubatov, the party’s top expert in “total mobilization” 
(and infamous for his leaked words on the existence of a detailed database on Right-wing 
constituency), began his career in 2002 as founding member of the Soroksár Civic Circle. He joined 
Fidesz in 2002 and one year later advanced to the position of the director of the same Budapest 
district’s Fidesz organization. In 2004, he was appointed director of the House of Citizens (Polgárok 
Háza), the new community and cultural center of the movement, which opened in August 2004. By the 
2006 parliamentary elections, he became Fidesz-MPSZ campaign manager responsible for 
mobilization. Further milestones of his ascendance include memberships in the parliament’s 
Committee on Human Rights, Minorities, Civil Society and Religion, and Committee on Culture and 
Media; and from 2006 the position of Fidesz-MPSZ’s national party director. Subsequently he was the 
mastermind behind the party’s campaign organization before the 2006 municipal elections, the 2008 
„social referendum,” and the 2009 EP elections.33 
Expanding the Right’s public sphere: spectacles, “deep stories,” and large organizations  
This paper argues that, in addition to its short-term effects, the “original accumulation” of social 
capital made an enduring deep impact on the Right’s civic associational life and political fortunes, 
which can be detected even today when the movement no longer exists in its original form. Political 
leaders were not silent about the circles’ lasting effect. In 2014, speaker of the Parliament László 
Kövér stressed:  
„[T]he civic circles and their activists turned politicians played an important role in the march of 
Fidesz from opposition to a government backed by parliamentary super-majority.”  
Tamás László, Chair of the Board of the Alliance for the Nation Foundation added that the civic 
circles’ „spirit” survived and its impact could be felt in:  
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„the landslide electoral victory, the Peace Marches, Fidesz’s philosophy of society, and the 
Basic Law [the country’s new constitution from January 1st 2012 – B. G.] […] The civic circles 
became ferment in Hungarian society.”
34
  
Some empirical evidence on pro-government protests under Fidesz-MPSZ rule indicates that the civic 
circles have had an „afterlife” indeed. Starting in 2012, Budapest and some other cities saw six large 
demonstrations called the “Peace Marches”. A new umbrella organization, the Civil Unity (CÖF), 
which claims to be the heir of Civic Circles Movement, brought to the streets hundreds of thousands of 
demonstrators – occasionally including a few thousand brothers-in-arms arriving from Poland - 
determined to defend the government and the country from “colonialization” by international banks, 
speculators, and the EU. CÖF is viewed as a Government-Organized NGO (GONGO), generously 
funded and controlled by the administration.
35
 Accordingly, critical media tend to depict the peace-
marchers as mercenaries: essentially pensioners bribed into contention by a per diem, sandwiches, 
drinks, and a free bus-trip to Budapest.  
While this assessment is not wrong, it may be incomplete. According to the findings of Pál 
Susánszky, Ákos Kopper and Gergely Tóth, „although participants in the Hungarian PGDs [pro-
government demonstrations – B. G.] hardly meet prevailing ideals of the autonomous citizen, it would 
be wrong to look at them merely as puppets manipulated by the regime. Rather, they are informed and 
concerned individuals, even though their social networks and media consumption habits differ 
extensively from those participating in CRD [critical demonstrations – B. G.].”36 The empirical 
research conducted by these authors found that while both pro-government protesters and their 
government-critical counterparts are well-informed about Hungarian affairs and tend to value 
democracy, the former are distinguished from the latter by more trust in the effectivity of their 
activism, higher frequency of membership in patriotic and religious civil organizations, and stronger 
reliance on Right-wing media for information on and interpretation of issues and events.  
By the second decade of the new Millennium, then, multiple cleavages appeared to be in place to 
structure the peace-marchers’ world-view and action. Yet, to make a political impact, such cleavages 
must be formed to begin with. This was especially the case in Hungary, where the socialist system had 
been an obstacle to expressing attachments to the nation, religion, and to civil activism. It follows that 
during the postsocialist transformation Hungarians practically had to learn anew how to be patriots, 
believers, citizens, and Europeans and on these grounds, distinguish themselves from others. As 
argued by Zsolt Enyedi, in the nascent Hungarian democracy Fidesz proved to be a key agent of 
cleavage formation along all the above lines.
37
 My paper substantiates that the party’s success in re-
shaping, deepening, and politicizing cleavages hinged on the civic circles’ groundwork for rebuilding 
the Right’s social base.  
As already hinted above, many individuals had reasons to feel that the civic circles gave them the 
sense of belonging, dignity, importance, and an autonomous voice on the matters crucial for them. In 
the following, I will demonstrate how these sentiments were created and strengthened. I suggest that 
the strong attachments emerged through the members’ regular encounters with each other and with 
leading activists, among them patriots, professionals, politicians, priests, and pundits, who, fighting as 
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Gramscian “organic intellectuals” for a hegemonic Right, offered new ways for Hungarians to feel, 
think, and act as members of “imagined communities.”38 The 2004 events database reveals the 
importance of versatile nationalism, church-bound activism, and the media, for the expansion of the 
Right’s “own” public sphere and the formation of related cleavages. 
Versatile nationalism 
Reflecting the movement’s aim to appeal to diverse and large audiences, many events in the database 
can be characterized by one or several of four patriotic and/or nationalist frames and sets of collective 
practices, labeled below „local patriotism”, „Sacral-Medievalism”, „European Hungary”, and the 
nation of „fifteen million Hungarians”. These nationalisms entailed specific imaginations of 
Hungarians as a community, were put on the banner of different types of organizations, and had varied 
political economic backgrounds. At the same time, the four components of versatile nationalism 
readily combined, and allowed “injustice framing” and “bricolage”, two effective techniques 
frequently used by social movements for making meanings of „the world out there”, defining the 
boundary between „us” and „them”, and „doing the emotion work”.39 Table 3 summarizes empirical 
evidence on the events associated with the four categories.  
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Table 3: Versatile nationalism: events and participating organizations in 2004 
Dimensions of 
versatile 
nationalism 
Local 
patriotism 
Sacral- 
Medievalism 
European 
Hungary  
Fifteen 
million 
Hungarians 
Total 
number 
and % 
percentage 
Imaginations 
of the 
community 
„the 
calendar is 
a model for 
community 
building” 
“Faith in 
Fakes” 
„Europe is 
our future, 
Hungary is 
our 
country” 
“who share 
the pain of 
Trianon” 
 
Number of 
events 
95 106 135 400 736 
% of all events 
in 2004 
(total 
number=1405)  
6.5 7 10 28 51.5 
Number of 
organizations 
101 113 270 661 1145 
Author’s calculation based on the Event Database 2004. Some events and organizations in specific 
categories combined several components of versatile nationalism, and the same organizations were 
participants in multiple events. Even so, this evidence leaves no doubt about the great importance 
of the „imagined community” and its variants for the mindset of civic circle activists and 
audiences. 
Local patriotism 
Interestingly, the events aimed to nurture attachments to the small (real rather than imagined) 
communities of the neighbourhood, habitat, and locality were the least frequent among the patriotic 
and/or nationalist events of the year 2004. The number of organizations specializing in local patriotic 
activities was also the smallest. These typically grass-roots and voluntary associations focused on local 
culture, maintenance of old or erection of new monuments of local history, publication of local 
calendars and almanachs, organization of balls, sports events, excursions, family programs, collection 
of donations for local charitable purposes, and mobilizing for participation in municipal politics. 
Financial support usually came from voluntary private giving, local businesses, local government 
sources, or various national programs to foster civil society.  
The fact that the events and associations, which came closest to the Tocquevillian model of 
„civicness” appeared only sporadically is less surprising if we consider that, as mentioned above, by 
2004 many of the civic circle activists were offered opportunities for upward political mobility to local 
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or even higher-level Fidesz-MPSZ organizations, which in turn led to the increasing involvement of 
the party in events “on the ground.” One example is the workshop that launched the 2005 Calendar of 
one of Budapest’s districts. The workshop aimed at local development and community building, took 
place in the House of Citizens, and was coordinated, funded, and attended by a group of partisan, 
civic, professional and business actors.  
„Lectures at the book launch: "Alliance with the people of Budapest for the people of Budapest " 
[…] Chair of the Budapest Fidesz organization and leader of the Fidesz fraction in the municipal 
legislative body; "The deficit of urban society" […] architect, director of the center New Budapest; 
"Region and community building" […] electrical engineer, entrepreneur, and main sponsor of the 
Calendar; "FOTEK – community of consumers and producers" […] director of Research and 
Development Group for Innovation in the Countryside, Károli Gáspár Calvinist University; 
"Spiritual networks" […] Piarist cleric; "The real word" […] Director of the House of Citizens; 
"The calendar – a model for community building" […] architect, Chair of Fidesz electoral district, 
and managing editor of the Calendar. We ask you to find a neighbour or acquaintance with whom 
you never had a word except for greeting each other. Christmas approaching, it’s time to ring their 
door-bell with a copy of the calendar and a small tray of cookies in your hand.”
40
 
A second explanation of the relatively modest number of local patriotic events is that many events of 
local relevance bore even stronger marks of different notions of nationalism, and were therefore 
classified as representations of one or another of the three remaining categories.  
Sacral-Medievalism 
A second type of patriotism/nationalism could be called Sacral-Medievalist because its adherents 
transcended historical epochs and ritually re-enacted the myths of ancient nation. Organized mainly by 
traditionalist associations, hobby historians, martial art clubs, or the networks of religious and (far-
Right leaning) „national” book-clubs and memorabilia boutiques, the events in this category included 
lectures on the life and mysteries of Saints, kings and queens, costumed ceremonies of Templars or 
other medieval knights’ orders, and expert-guided meditative tours to Hungary’s mystic places, such 
as the Pilis mountain (seen by some as the true centre of the Universe). Thematic summer camps 
organized for children and the young to make them familiar with the legends of Hunor, Magor, Attila 
the Hun, as well as the skill of runiform writing or ancient Hungarian martial arts complete the list. 
Arguably, however, the cult of King Saint Stephen’s Sacra Corona stood out for its elaborate 
spectacles and nation-wide popularity alike. 
„With the ceremony, we want to nurture the nation’s dignity. The Sacred Crown is the symbol and 
embodiment of our nation’s historical continuity and unity […] The center of events will be a two-
meter-high and four-meter-wide replica of the Crown illuminated by candles symbolizing the 
pearls of the original. Citizens of our district and its neighbourhood will personify the Apostles 
and Saints depicted on the enamel paintwork of the Sacred Crown. […], the famous actor, holder 
of the Kossuth Prize, will be the master of ceremony, and […] acclaimed singers and choirs will 
perform in the musical interludes. Everybody is welcome to take a voluntary oath on the Crown, 
and upon request may get a certificate of participation in the ritual. We also want to leave a trace 
for future times: A Sacred Crown memorial mound to be built from the soil brought by the 
participants. We respectfully ask the attendees to bring (in a glass or a small bucket) a handful of 
soil from their home, and leave a message in the memorial album of the event. Please, come with 
candles or torches! Posters, program-leaflets, or the oath’s words are provided for preparation and 
dissemination of information. […] We recommend visiting the Sacred Crown in the Parliament, 
and the coronation mantle in the National Museum.”
41
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While the premodern Christian/pagan aspects of Sacral-Medievalism seem evident, I believe the 
postmodern inspiration of these imaginings ought to be taken no less seriously. In this perspective 
Sacral-Medievalism could be viewed as the local variant of „new Medievalism” analyzed in Umberto 
Eco’s Faith in Fakes.42 Accordingly, I risk the hypothesis that the spread of Sacral-Medievalist frames 
and practices might be no less due to the general popularity of the Lord of the Rings, Star Wars, Harry 
Potter, Game of Thrones and their commercialization in movies, collectibles, and table or computer 
games, than by genuine fascination with the myths and secrets of Hungary’s ancient history.  
Compared to local patriotism and Sacral-Medievalism, which define Hungarians as members of 
small local or virtually timeless communities, respectively, the two remaining imaginations represent 
the transborder and transnational dimensions of the Civic Circles Movement. The first concept defines 
the nation in civic terms and its members as citizens of a European Hungary. In the second frame, the 
nation is perceived as an ethnic, cultural, and spiritual community of fifteen million Hungarians. The 
events of the year 2004 seem particularly apt for taking a snapshot of these varieties, because the final 
phase of preparation for EU accession on May 1st, 2004 raised vexing questions and fueled fears, 
hopes, and debates about Hungarians’ fate in an enlarged European Union. 
European Hungary 
The essence of events in this category is best captured by the title of Fidesz-MPSZ’s EU-accession 
program document: “Europe is our future; Hungary is our country.” In line with the party’s and the 
civic circles’ somewhat reserved but overall positive stance towards EU-membership, most events 
offered (oftentimes transnational) forums for learning about the details and political and policy 
consequences of accession. The needed expertise was provided by European and domestic 
professionals and politicians. The bulk of funding may have come from EU grants and Hungarian state 
programs. Far from celebrating the admittance to the EU with unbridled euphoria, the European 
framing of national issues - or the national framing of European issues - tended to emphasize 
Hungary’s unique contributions to the EU, and the implied risks (and not only opportunities) of 
enlargement for the nation, religion, culture, and the economy.  
„At the closing event of the third and last day of the Free Europe Youth Festival in Győr, Viktor 
Orbán and Helmut Kohl shared their thoughts about the EU and the June EP elections. According 
to the former Chancellor of Germany […] it is natural that some are afraid of the dramatic 
changes, but the problem is that such fears can limit the achievements of individuals and 
peoples. ’I urge everybody to participate in the elections, because Hungary needs Europe just as 
much as Europe needs Hungary.’ Viktor Orbán […] highlighted that Hungarians bring to Europe 
their enthusiasm about hard work: coming from poverty our attitude differs from that of Western 
people. Furthermore, we see the EU not only as a free community of citizens, but also as a 
community of communities. Given our problem that not all the Hungarians can join with us the 
EU, we are in the position to remind others of the importance of the nation as a community. […] 
Orbán warned that by no means is the EU- membership a remedy for everything. If a country’s 
economy is kept in order and performs well, then joining the EU may bring further improvements. 
However, since the success of accession depends on the performance of the government, 
Hungarians have reasons to be afraid and feel unsecure.”
43 
Another, more directly political understanding of the benefits from a European citizenship informed 
the civic circles’ frequent references to European norms, rules, and standards whenever they framed 
domestic grievances, and sought remedies at EU-institutions.
44
 This way, EU-accession opened up 
new opportunities for the civic circles to position themselves as the true representatives of the nation 
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and of European citizenry simultaneously, in contrast to the Left and Liberal rulers whose visions and 
practices were permanently criticized for being at odds with both. 
Finally, many events within this cluster were part of the campaign before the country’s first EP 
elections on June 13th, 2004, which meant a new chance for the Right to demonstrate its regained 
strength in political confrontation with its rivals in the electoral arena.  
Fifteen million Hungarians  
Table 3 shows that the nation as the community of fifteen million Hungarians was the frame for the 
largest cluster of nationalist events in 2004. Further, the more than 600 smaller or larger patriotic and 
transborder organizations involved in these events dwarf the number of organizers of all the other 
nationalist events taken together. Several explanations can be given for the attraction of this Greater 
Hungarian nationalism.
45
  
In my interpretation, the notion of fifteen million Hungarians appealed to sentiments of wide 
resonance among the members and sympathizers of civic circles by its inherent „deep story”. In the 
words of Arlie Russell Hochschield, who coined this term to capture the motifs of Tea Party 
sympathizers in the USA, „[a] deep story is a feels-as-if story – it’s the story feelings tell, in the 
language of symbols. It removes judgement. It removes fact. It tells us how things feel. Such a story 
permits those on both sides of the political spectrum to stand back and explore the subjective prism 
through which the party on the other side sees the world.”46  
In our case, the deep story was the suffering brought by the Trianon Treaty signed after the lost 
First World War in 1920, which forced Hungary to hand over two-thirds of its territory and 60 percent 
of its population - including millions of ethnic Hungarians - to neighbouring states. According to „the 
story feelings tell”, Hungarians were those (and only those) „who shared the pain of Trianon.” The 
civic circles advanced the „emotion work” by activities whose purpose was to remember, mourn, and 
militate against the loss, celebrate the nation’s splendid past, but also to excommunicate, as it were, 
those who failed appreciate the nation’s past greatness, or to feel the pain of Trianon if for nothing else 
then because they trusted that joining a borderless Europe would eventually heal the nation’s historical 
wounds.  
To re-tell the deep story repeatedly, a Trianon museum was established; several TV and movie 
documentaries about Trianon and its consequences were shot and widely shown; related books and 
pamphlets were discussed at lectures and workshops; dozens of Trianon monuments were erected and 
inaugurated all over Hungary; and memorial events were held in numerous places. Old and new 
grievances of Hungarian minorities in the neighbouring countries were given wide publicity. For some 
of the atrocities against Hungarian minorities after the Second World War symbolic remedies were 
sought at EU-level forums. Time and again, the suffering of Trianon’s victims was labelled the 
„Hungarian Holocaust”, and demands for „equal opportunities for remembering” and grief were 
raised.  
Beyond remembering Trianon, the movement tried to „reunite” the fifteen million Hungarians in no 
less symbol-rich but at the same time more practical ways as well. These efforts included frequent 
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crossings of state borders in all directions; building contacts with or even “adopting” individuals, 
institutions, villages and towns of Hungarian minorities; and attending lectures, conferences, and 
displays of all-Hungarian treasures of art and literature.  
Interestingly, donations and other kinds of help offered to needy persons, groups, and under-funded 
educational, religious, and social welfare institutions in the neighbouring countries accounted for the 
bulk of the movement’s charitable activities. It appears that the metropolitan middle-class activists’ 
faith in the fraternité of 15 million Hungarians combined with their peculiar concern about the social 
and, even more importantly, cultural égalité of the 5 million living farthest away from them. Irony of 
ironies, during the current refugee crisis the Right keeps criticizing the Left and Liberal middle-classes 
of the country’s capital for their biased and hypocritical solidarity, namely for showing more 
compassion with migrants coming from the distant places and cultures of the Middle-East and North 
Africa than for their own compatriots in need within and without Hungary.  
Perhaps the most popular way to turn the imagined community into more real implied frequent 
journeys to former Greater Hungarian territories. To be sure, travels to Transylvania, Southern and 
Eastern Slovakia, or the Carpathian Ukraine have never been the Right’s monopoly. However, the 
civic circles’ tourism differed from ordinary excursions in several respects. Dozens of specialist 
business enterprises offered trips at lower price to civic-circle members, and attracted them with 
reliable professional guides and in some cases even bus-drivers coming from the movement. The 
organizers promised authentic Hungarian hospitality and personal encounters with locals who hosted 
the travelers in their guest-rooms, offered traditional meals of their home-cuisine, and entertained the 
guests with folklore spectacles. These journeys routinely included stopovers at the very same 
legendary places of Greater Hungarian history. As revealed by the sometimes exalted “travelogues” in 
the Event Database, all these features made the adventures at the “headwaters” of national identity 
more reminiscent of pilgrimages to sacred places than of the usual experiences of mass tourism.
47
  
Finally, the cause of reuniting fifteen million Hungarians provided the motivation for the circles’ 
most important political venture. On December 5th, the political year of 2004 culminated in a 
referendum on granting Hungarian citizenship to the five million ethnic Hungarians living abroad. The 
civic circles’ campaign slogan “Passport to Europe” was a powerful expression of the organizers’ 
ambition to include all members of the ethnic-cultural community in the citizenry of European 
Hungary. Coordinated by the World Alliance of Hungarians (MVSZ), many other patriotic 
organizations, and the Historical Churches within and without Hungary, as well as by hundreds of 
smaller circles, the mobilization for the referendum explains the peak of nationalist events in 
November and December 2004.  
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Figure 1: Events related to „15 million Hungarians”, and „European Hungary” (% of all events, 
2004) 
 
Author’s calculation based on the Event Database 2004. 
Indeed, in terms of the number of events at least, the mobilization was more extensive than the earlier 
campaigns before EU-enlargement and the EP-elections in April to June 2004. The example below 
illustrates the emotional, spectacular, and transborder character of the campaign.  
„A young group from the Matthew Coronation Church parish […] will march on november 21th-
27th from Nagyvárad [Oradea, Romania – B. G.] to Budapest, to remind the citizens of Hungary 
of their moral responsibility concerning the coming historical referendum on december 5
th
, and ask 
them to offer the chance of Hungarian citizenship also to their brothers and sisters across the 
border. The purpose of the pilgrimage is to bear witness of cross-border solidarity by bringing 
home the messages of those, whose fate is at stake in the referendum. […] While the pilgrims can 
only contribute their feet, heart and time, they would be honored if […] they could take back home 
messages by many ordinary people and luminaries. Please, support our cause with brief written 
statements, and convince many others to do the same. […] Addressed „From Hungarian to 
Hungarian,” the letters should be sent to the Nagyvárad Bishop’s Office. […] Whether coming 
from Nagyvárad, the Partium, Transylvania, or Székely Land, those who can should attend the 
holy mass in the Nagyvárad cathedral, and give us their message in person. […] All those present 
at the mass are then welcome to walk together with the young group from Budapest and others 
from Transylvania to the border crossing. Individuals may join the pilgrimage for its whole 
duration or for a limited time. More information is provided by the Kolozsvár [Cluj-Napoca, 
Romania – B. G.] office of the Transylvanian Association of the World Alliance of Hungarians 
(MVSZ).”
48
 
Despite all the efforts, the turnout at the referendum remained below the threshold of validity. The 1.5 
million “yes” votes barely exceeded the 1.45 million votes for Fidesz-MPSZ at the June 13th EP-
elections. The civic circles, the patriotic organizations, and the party blamed each other for the fiasco. 
For some party leaders, the failure was proof of the movement’s limited mobilizing capacity. 
However, in Csaba Hende’s view, the real reason was the insufficient financial and political support 
given to the movement: 
„On december 5th the villages performed very badly indeed. But let us not forget that in most 
villages neither Fidesz nor the civic circles are present […] The country has about 3000 
municipalities […] In the past fifteen years the parties managed to reach out to about 500 of them 
[…] while the rest remained a blank spot for political actors. Even without financial and serious 
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political support, in the past two-and-half years the civic circles managed to “dig” twice as deep 
[…] I did all I could: I sent written invitations to civic circle members to our campaign events 
where we asked them to convince their relatives and acquaintances to attend and vote ’yes’ at the 
referendum, and tried to help them with arguments on why this was important. But we could not 
organize 3000 rallies, especially that the small municipalities lacked even public venues to host 
such events.”
49
 
One disappointed member asked, how on earth could one assign responsibility for the great “cause of 
uniting the nation to the small pensioners living in miserable conditions in socialist housing estates?”50 
Similarly, Viktor Orbán’s diagnosis stressed social problems.  
“Without offering remedies for the precarious conditions of Hungarian life, we will not be able to 
build more robust support for the national cause […] All those committed to the future of the 
nation must now focus on the social question. Therefore, I ask the adherents of radical Right 
whose utmost priority is national identity to also realize: the most important message of the 
referendum is that the success in our fight against precarious living conditions is a pre-condition 
for building a strong nation.”
51
 
In fact, the party’s more pragmatic and “materialist” political strategy and the movement’s radicalizing 
identity-based agenda had started to grow apart well before the referendum. As reported by Attila 
Körömi, an MP for Fidesz-MPSZ who in April 2004 left the party with disillusionment and later 
joined Jobbik, the Fidesz leaders arrived at a turning point when they started preparations for the 2004 
EP-elections. At a fraction meeting on April 5th, 2004, Orbán introduced Árpád Habony, the party’s 
new campaign boss and architect of its new strategy. Referring to a new large-N opinion poll 
commissioned by the party Orbán reportedly told:  
“The poll shows that Fidesz divided the country […] To reduce the voters’ aversion, we must win 
the hearts and minds of those undecided or Left-minded voters, who are dissatisfied with their 
living standards. The Left-Right division does not make sense anymore. The issues of Hungarian 
minorities in the neighbouring countries and their declining numbers are less and less useful for 
defining the terms of political discourse. All in all, we must admit that the Kádár-regime 
triumphed and proved to be the ultimate winner of transition. Hence the need for cooperation with 
Left-wing pundits who should be allowed to speak on behalf of Fidesz. Our future task is to focus 
on economic problems, the difficulties of everyday life, indebtedness, uncertainty, and fear, and 
hammer in these topics through repeating them.”
52
  
Along these lines, the party’s campaign during the run-up to the EP election centered on a National 
Petition demanding protective measures in the areas of housing, healthcare, agriculture, and 
employment to mitigate the expected negative social consequences of EU-accession. Since this 
petition heralded a new era of social welfare demands, which came to dominate Fidesz-MPSZ’s 
strategy in the following years, it also led to a deepening divide between the party and the movement. 
The civic circles were left alone in their pursuit of identity-based national unification. It is telling that 
while individual circles and the aligned patriotic organizations started their campaign for the dual 
citizenship already in the Spring of 2004 (or even earlier), the circles headquarter launched its 
centralized campaign for „Passport to Europe” three weeks, and Fidesz-MPSZ only a single week, 
before the referendum. The party’s half-hearted and delayed move did not leave much time for using 
the canvassing weapon.  
                                                     
49
 Event Database, 2005; www.gondola.hu 
50
 Event Database, 2004. 
51
 Event Database, 2004; www.mno.hu  
52
 Körömi Attila, „Polgári társadalom vagy Kádár-rendszer. Az otthonról hozott, majd bennem formálódó értékrend 
késztetett cselekvésre.” [Civility Versus the Kádár-regime. Values Originating in My Family and Shaped by My Own 
Experiences Guided My Action.] Magyar Nemzet, April 18, 2017. 
Rebuilding the Hungarian Right through Civil Organization and Contention: The Civic Circles Movement 
European University Institute 23 
The contradiction between the party’s materialist electoral and the movement’s identity-centered 
mobilization strategies led to a new, fragmented, mode of coordination. While chief coordinator 
Hende and his apparatus stayed closely aligned with Fidesz-MPSZ, the mobilization of the circles’ 
rank and file was largely left in the hands of nationalists, whose divisive radicalism sat uneasy with the 
new agenda of opening towards broader constituencies mainly concerned about social issues. Gone 
was the time when all the circles and the parties of the Right „moved together.” Henceforth, the Fidesz 
party’s messages were addressed in a new populist fashion to „the people” rather than to „civic 
Hungary”.53 Conversely, although this way the civic circles gained some autonomy from party control, 
their emancipation happened at the price of radicalization, fragmentation and declining political 
significance, which foreshadowed their ultimate demise. (See more on this below in the section on the 
media.)  
Omnipresent Historical Churches 
As shown in Table 4 below, the “historical”, that is, first and foremost the Roman Catholic, Reformed 
Calvinist, and Lutheran Churches within and without Hungary, played a prominent role in hosting, 
organizing, performing at and shaping the agenda and character of civic circle events. 
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Table 4: Omnipresent “Historical” Churches (% of all, i.e. 1405, events in 2004) 
 Venue Participating 
individuals / 
organizations 
Theme 
% of all events 
in 2004 
13 15 11 
 Church, 
monastery, 
monument  
Other 
Church-
bound 
(mainly 
high-
schools) 
Clergy Other 
Church-
bound 
Religious 
ceremony 
(e.g. Holy 
Mass) 
Other 
religion 
or 
church-
related  
% of all events 
in 2004 
6 7 7 9 3 8 
  
Events with at least one Church-related feature 
 
 
% of all events 
in 2004 
 
 
23 
 
Author’s calculation based on the Event Database, 2004. Many events represented the influence of 
Hungary’s Historical Churches on several of the three main dimensions, and combined multiple 
venues, participants, and themes.  
Several explanations can be given for this. The most obvious of these is ideological affinity, which 
was a frequent topic of discussion at workshops, lectures, and public statements by members of the 
clergy, the Christian Democratic parties, and lay civic activists alike.  
No less important was the massive infrastructural, ideological, and manpower that the Churches 
had at their disposal and were willing to offer to the movement. As many as 13 percent of all events in 
2004 were hosted by churches, monasteries, the community rooms of parishes, Church-bound primary 
schools, gymnasiums, universities, healthcare institutions, and care homes for the elderly. It is 
important to recall, that the restitution of church property culminated under the Fidesz-led government 
of 1998-2002. The Roman Catholic Church alone was returned the buildings and other property of 300 
gymnasiums. 2002 marked the beginning of „payback time”. 
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Furthermore, 16 percent of the events involved members of the clergy or other Church-bound civic 
and political organizations and their prominent representatives. Their enthusiasm about the movement 
is illustrated by the recollection of one priest cited by Enyedi: „When the idea emerged, all the Rosary 
Societies in my environment turned automatically into civic circles”. According to the Events 
Database, similar transitions happened in some Church-bound educational institutions.
 54
 
Finally, the omnipresence of Historical Churches could be motivated by their fear that, unlike the 
previous conservative administration, the new Left-Liberal government would not grant them the 
privileged status of quasi „state-Churches.” The Churches might have realized the need for stronger 
presence in civil society, to mobilize followers and combat adversaries „from below” to protect their 
ideology, institutions, and interests in public policy and media. Clearly, the Christian spiritual 
influence and collective action was present in many areas of civic activism, from holidays to 
entertainment, or politics. 
When celebrated by the civic circles, practically all of Hungary’s holidays – whether traditionally 
Christian or national and/or nonreligious – became imbued with Christian spirit. Hardly any 
commemoration of the revolutions of 1848 and 1956, or of the heroes and victims of the First and 
Second World Wars, would take place without a Holy Mass, procession under Christian symbols, or 
collective prayer in town or across the country. Campaigns were launched to name bridges, streets, 
professional associations of conservative lawyers, teachers, doctors, and educational and healthcare 
institutions after Hungarian Saints. Indeed, displaying the Gramscian strategy of recapturing holidays, 
some civic circles tried to add a dose of religious content to the traditional holidays of the Left, such as 
the International Workers’ Day. 
„On 1st of May, 2004, starting at 10am, the […] civic association goes maying in honor of Saint 
Joseph the Laborer at the […] chapel. The event starts with a Holy Mass celebrated by the main 
sponsor of the event, bishop […]. Invited honored guests and speakers are: the acting vice 
president of Slovakian Hungarian Coalition Miklós Duray, writer and publicist Zsolt Bayer, 
Member of Parliament Péter Szijjártó, and the President of the city’s Fidesz organization, dr. 
Csaba András Dézsi. The program includes cultural and sports events, as well as various 
entertainment for kids. For 850 Forints, the local Candle Lights Restaurant offers beef goulash 
cooked in red wine, and served with boiled potatoes, pickled peppers and cucumbers, and two 
slices of bread.”
55
  
One of the events to celebrate EU-accession was a highly unconventional soccer game organized by 
the clergy.  
„On 8th, June, 2004 a soccer game of priests will take place in the Ferencváros Stadium, to help 
the orphanage of Déva [Romania]. The national team of Hungarian priests invited its Slovak 
counterpart for a brotherly contest in service of a truly serious cause. All the revenue from the 
match will be offered to help the orphans and other handicapped minors of the Franciscan 
monastery of Déva. In their appeal, God’s servants stress that they want to enter the European 
Union through this competition between brothers for a noble cause. The Hungarian team includes 
two newly inaugurated bishops […] The stadium could host 40 thousand fans. Let us pray together 
for a fully packed arena, which would be a great help to Déva’s orphans. Main organizer: father 
[…]”.
56
  
The last example illustrates the role of the clergy in the process of collecting signatures for the 
referendum on dual citizenship.  
„Dénes Kiss, Chair of the Trianon Society and Miklós Patrubány, Chair of the World Organization 
of Hungarians […] asked citizens to support the initiative for referendum on dual citizenship with 
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their signature […]. If we may suggest: a new list of signatures after every Holy Mass. Every 
priest will help if duly approached.”
57
  
Media influence 
The Events Database indicates that by 2004 the situation of Right-wing media became consolidated 
even if the media landscape remained overall imbalanced. Campaigns for fundraising, subscriptions 
and channeling advertisment to Right-wing media outlets, and reports on launching new media and 
watchdog organizations were less frequent in 2004 than in previous years. Similarly, even if these 
issues remained contentious, neither government interference into matters of the media, nor the lies 
and scandalous contents of Left-Liberal media happened to provoke as many protests as in 2002 or 
2003. Instead, most events meant meetings between media pundits and their audiences. 
Table 5: Cleavage formation in media consumption. Events in 2004. 
 All media-
related 
events  
Attack Left-
liberal and 
commercial 
media & defend 
Right-wing 
media  
Supporting old 
Right-wing media 
(fundraising, 
subscriptions, 
advertisment), 
and launching 
new Right-wing 
media & 
watchdogs 
Media pundits 
meet audience 
 
Number of 
events 
 
186 
 
 
25 
 
8 
 
153 
 
% of all events 
in 2004 (=1405) 
 
 
13.2 
 
0.2 
 
0.1 
 
11 
Author’s calculation based on the Event Database, 2004. 
However, the uneven distribution of these meetings across various discussion groups and media clubs 
points to the increasing divisions and fragmentation within the Right’s public sphere. Rather than 
„moving together”, different media were more or rather less supportive of the movement’s cause and 
actvities. For example, Csaba Hende complained that,  
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„one weekly allegedly belonging to the national camp has yet to publish a single positive article 
about the civic circles.”
58
  
In contrast, other media outlets were more than willing to influence and amplify the circles’ voices. 
Specifically, in 2004 a handful of media clubs and forums – (in)famous about the radicalism of their 
programs, pundits, and audiences - prominently the Magyar Ház Club of the weekly Magyar 
Demokrata, the Sajtóklub, and the Arcvonal Irodalmi Kávéház, hosted most of the media-related 
events.  
Figure 2: Media pundits meet audience. Number of events, 2004 
 
Author’s calculation based on the Event Database, 2004. 
István Malgot, originally a prominent member of Orbán’s Alliance for the Nation Civic Circle and 
editor of its official journal Szövetség criticized Fidesz-MPSZ for turning a blind eye to the fact that 
the increasing influence “volunteer corps” of Far-Right journalists led to the movement’s 
fragmentation and radicalization.  
„The permanent fight needs disciplied soldiers who execute the orders rather than real intellectuals 
who can use truthful and rational arguments to influence and convince others. This intelligentsia 
all but left Fidesz. It was replaced by a handful of scribblers from Sajtóklub and Demokrata, a so 
callled radical weekly. This volunteer corps undermined Fidesz’s chances to create a majority 
behind the national cause. In the last one-and-half year we witnessed the spread of foul, 
demagogic and unacceptable views in the newspapers, which call themselves radical but are 
explicitly on the far-Right. Nazi, antisemitic and Hungarist pamphlets are put on sale at our 
cultural and political events and by our so called national bookshops, making their filthy content 
acceptable as it were for the new generations. As a consequence, it is the national camp itself that 
becomes less and less acceptable together with Fidesz, which, while far from being unaware of, 
remains silent about and turns a blind eye to these developments.”
59
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Conclusions and questions for further research  
Let me summarize my findings on the contributions of the Civic Circle Movement to Hungarian 
political and civic associational life. As far as the political consequences are concerned, the circles 
helped build a robust social foundation for the Fidesz-regime, which can partly explain its resilience 
and characteristic features. The movement was also instrumental in expanding the Right’s public 
sphere, and forging alliances between large organizations – the domestic and transborder nationalist 
associations, the Historical Churches, and some (but not all) of the political parties - and the smaller 
civil organizations. Time and again, the movement even managed to bring about tactical ad-hoc 
cooperation with globalization-critical, environmental, and peace movements, and certain civil and 
human rights NGOs, despite that they were far from fully sharing the Right’s ideological orientation.60  
Furthermore, the circles proved important for Fidesz-MPSZ’s efforts to reform its internal 
structure, multiply its membership and the number of its local affiliates, recruit and allow upward 
political mobility of an army of enthusiastic activists. Many of the party’s current top leaders came 
from the circles. All this allowed Fidesz-MPSZ to gradually catch up with the MSZP in using effective 
electoral campaign technologies, such as canvassing. All in all, Orbán had serious reasons to claim 
that without the movement Fidesz would have become a medium-size party of meagre importance.  
Coming to the impact on civic associational life, today Hungarian civil society cannot be 
characterized as generally weak. While its Left and Liberal sectors appear to have weakened, its Right 
sector has grown more robust. Even if the Civic Circles Movement no longer exists, many of its 
Church-bound, cultural, patriotic, festive and professional activities are likely to continue. The 
foundations for this were, again, partly laid by the movement, which opened new opportunities for 
hitherto ignored and/or marginalized individuals to become „organic intellectuals” and opinion makers 
on the Right and, aligned in the circles, form a powerful intellectual (and not only political) counter-
movement against the Left and Liberal pundits’ „un-Hungarian” hegemony. Accordingly, after 2010 
the Orbán-regime has canonized and generously supported many of the civic circles’ early 
experiments with ideas, narratives, heroes, and symbols. Finally, the movement’s activist legacy 
partially explains the massive participation in the Civil Unity’s marches as well.  
Nevertheless, I also found that the movement’s mobilizing capacity was limited even in its heyday. 
While the circles helped stabilize and marginally expand Fidesz’s core constituency via ever 
increasing doses of identity politics, they fell short of reaching out to those less or not at all 
preoccupied with issues of identity. Hence the increasing salience of the social question in Fidesz’s 
strategy, which started to bring fruits when the economic situation deteriorated and the incumbents 
lost their remaining meagre credibility as advocates of „socially sensitive” policies.  
Meanwhile, however, the Right – this time the originally Far-Right Jobbik party – became first 
mover in giving voice to the grievances of those massive groups of population, which were out of 
reach for Fidesz-MPSZ and the civic circles alike. Interestingly, when organizing the paramilitary 
Hungarian Guard to combat „Gypsy crime” on the country’s spatial and social peripheries, the Jobbik 
party’s leader Gábor Vona referred to the civic circles as a role model.61  
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Did the Hungarian Left and Liberal parties learn anything from the Civic Circles Movement? I 
doubt they did. Yet to find out why is a topic for future inquiry. After all, it is quite puzzling that the 
conquest of civil society occurred, as it were, under the radar of the MSZP-SZDSZ coalition. How to 
make sense of their weak response to the challenge posed by the Right in civil organization and 
contention? It would be certainly difficult to argue that the challenge was not new at all, because the 
Left had always been inferior in terms of social embeddedness. As Ferenc Kőszeg, formerly a leader 
of democratic opposition against the Kádár regime and later of SZDSZ recalled:  
“Despite their shrinking membership, the Socialists are omnipresent. They have enough people on 
the ground ‘who can distribute red carnations on International Womens’ Day, and propagate the 
party line in shops, playgrounds, and among pensioners playing cards. Reaching to the roots of 
society, the Socialists’ campaign [during the 1994 elections – B. G.] proved to be tremendously 
effective’.”
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Alternative explanations would suggest that during their many years in power the MSZP and SZDSZ 
did little to prevent their „own” civil sector from withering away. In an earlier article, I suggested an 
ideological explanation, namely that the dominant liberal and „Third-way socialist” view of 
democracy equated citizens’ political involvement largely with voting and only very specific forms of 
civic activism, such as protection of civil rights and the rights of minorities, but barely anything else.  
A second reasoning may be political. Within their coalition governments the Left and Liberal 
parties kept competing for influence over politics and policy making, and their struggle reinforced 
their mutual ambivalence, sometimes even suspicion and jealousy, towards each other’s organizational 
bases in society. This was particularly true for the trade unions and professional associations inherited 
from communist times, which the Liberals tended to view as threats to marketization, sources of 
unwanted interference with parliamentary democratic representation and decision making, and saw as 
“natural” allies of the Socialists.63  
Finally, and ironically, the lack of a perceived need for civil society backing could be explained by 
the electoral successes of the Left and Liberal camp. Strength in parliament especially before the 
MSZP was hit with scandal, might also help to explain that actors on the Left chose to work through 
formal political channels.
64
 
The jury is still out to judge whether the weak response was due to some of the above-mentioned 
reasons or should rather be traced to deeper structural obstacles to reinvigorating the Left and 
Liberals’ “own” civic associational life. Whatever the correct answer, the main underlying question is 
like the one currently posed by Brexit, Donald Trump’s and Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s victory, as well as 
other manifestations of ascending anti-liberalism: Do Left and Liberal actors still have the skill, will, 
and the organizational and ideational resources of a vibrant civil society to resist the implementation 
of illiberal and anti-democratic political programs?  
From this, a couple of no less puzzling questions follow: Can those who rally around the rainbow 
banner of open society’s universalist emancipatory agendas learn from their opponents who put their 
faith in the imagined communities united by the tricolor or the cross? Since for the time being I have 
no convincing answer, I end this paper with a few related questions inspired by the Hungarian 
experience. Is there an alternative „deep story” that would unite „the colors of the rainbow”? Or 
should such a story be (re)invented and/or better translated into everyday activism and community life 
at all levels? Will a Tocquevillian strategy suffice to recapture some of the societal space occupied by 
those who, once in power, turned out to be enemies of open society? Or should the advocates of open 
                                                     
62
 Kőszeg Ferenc, Múltunk vége. [The End of our Past.] (Pozsony: Kalligram, 2017). (Köszeg refers to the observation of 
the late Ottilia Solt, that time a leading politician of SZDSZ). 
63
 Béla Greskovits, „The Hollowing and Backsliding of Democracy in East Central Europe”. Global Policy 6, 51 (June 
2015): 28-37.  
64
 Greskovits and Wittenberg, „Civil Society and Democratic Consolidation” 2016, 25.  
Béla Greskovits 
30 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers 
society turn „Gramscian”, much the way their adversaries have done while in opposition? Are there 
ways for striking a more up-to-date balance between NGO-professionalism and social movement 
activism; between focus on the individual and the community; and between the interests and the 
passions? Finally, how to get „from here to there”? At which level to start rethinking and then 
reinventing open society: the locality, the nation (however it is imagined), or the European Union? 
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